Section Four

Module 13: The Belief Systems of Speech-Language Pathology 

  • What underlying beliefs does the culture of speech-language pathology include?

  • After working with the material in this module, readers will be able to

    • Discuss the implications of a cultural assumption that professionals exist and that clients exis

    • Discuss the implications of a cultural assumption that normal exists and is preferred to abnormal

    • Discuss the implications of a cultural assumption that the speech, language, and social communication patterns of White monolingual speakers of the northern dialects of American English are normal, typical, and/or preferred

Thinking about our own cultures’ underlying assumptions or beliefs can be difficult, precisely because they are underlying and assumed. Let’s make the effort here, though, to name and consider several assumptions that have shaped our profession.

As we started with in Module 1, many definitions of culture refer to the (inner) beliefs and (outward) behaviors that are shared by a group of people. Many cultural beliefs and behaviors are explicitly taught, passed on to the next generations of children or, in the case of our speech-language pathology culture, passed on to the next generations of graduate students and new professionals.

Some beliefs, however, are so fundamental or so ingrained in a group’s thinking patterns that they are actually relatively rarely verbalized. They are the ideas that do not need to be taught or learned because they are simply always there — assumed, shared, intuited, or absorbed. They are the underlying bedrock assumptions you find when you dig underneath, and then dig underneath there, and then underneath there once more.

This module will explore three such underlying and typically unspoken assumptions that shape the culture of speech-language pathology. You might be able to think of others, if you can figure out how to stand far enough away from our shared professional culture to be able to see it clearly.

Underlying Assumption One: Professionals and Clients Exist

Was your response to this heading along the lines of “um, yes, of course”?

The fact that people exist is a perfect example of the kind of underlying belief that we do not often feel the need to verbalize. Within our speech-language pathology culture, we do not often feel the need to state that our profession exists, that we exist, or that clients exist. We treat these points as obvious background knowledge. We start our conversations several levels up from these bedrock positions, at the place of discussing what exactly our profession should do, with whom, or why, because we assume, without needing to state, that we all exist.

Notice also, however, as Module 12 addressed, that we assume not merely that we all exist but also that “we,” the speech-language pathologists, can be separated from “them,” our clients. Moreover, we assume, and sometimes repeat explicitly, that we are professionals or experts. We view ourselves as specialized and educated professionals; we describe ourselves as educators, teachers, service providers, experts, or coordinators. We value our specialized knowledge, and we require aspiring members of our group to gain and demonstrate their mastery of our specialized knowledge.

We also assume that our profession exists not merely to have specialized knowledge but to apply our knowledge in ways that we intend ultimately to help someone other than ourselves. This assumption often does rise to the level of being stated; we are the applied profession, we might say, as we attempt to distinguish ourselves from lingustics or basic neurology. Linguists study language to understand language; we study linguistics to be able to use that knowledge to help people. If we are engaged in clinical service delivery, we assume that we as the speech-language pathologists can be differentiated from the students, clients, or members of the public with whom and for whom we believe ourselves to be working. We assume that our role is to assess someone else, to diagnose someone else, or to provide therapy for someone else. Even when we are engaged in the domains of professional practice of speech-language pathology, rather than engaged in clinical service delivery, we usually assume that our underlying goal is ultimately to help someone else, in the shorter or longer term, through our teaching, managing, conducting research, or other activities.

Consider this implicit underlying structure, an assumption that we exist and also that our professional world can be divided into professionals and non-professionals, or into speech-language pathologists, on the one hand, and separate people who are relevant to speech-language pathology but who are not speech-language pathologists, on the other. This structure was not a necessary feature of our profession, when our profession was founded. A profession about individuals’ speech and language abilities, or even about individuals’ “speech defects,” could have been designed more as an observational self-study group, if all members were assumed or actively required to have the condition being studied. It could also have been a self-help group or mutual-aid society, within which everyone was seen as an equal contributor.

Because of the interests of our professional ancestors (Module 12), however, we are not an observational self-study group, a self-help group, or a mutual-aid society. We are aware, of course, that sometimes speech-language pathologists themselves need speech-language pathology services; self-reflections along these lines often lead to publications encouraging us to be aware of what our clients are experiencing. Notice, however, that the terminology and the structure of these publications preserve the distinction between professionals and clients even as they recognize that the same person might play both roles under different circumstances. Such stories seek to remind us about what clients are experiencing as they seek care, try to find time in their busy lives for our assigned worksheets, work to navigate the complexities of communication or swallowing after a stroke, and so on. The message might be “We each have our own expertise, and both kinds of expertise matter” or “Don’t forget to think about what’s like from the client’s point of view,” but the message is not “We are all playing essentially the same role here.” We assume, as a profession, in other words, that professionals exist and that clients exist.

Underlying Assumption Two: Normal Exists, Normal Serves as an Important Starting Point, and Normal is Preferred

Now think back to the overall organizing structure of your master’s program, your graduate school classes, and even your textbooks. How did you earn your right to become part of the culture of speech-language pathologists?

First you learned about normal anatomy, physiology, and neurology; the normal phonetic structure of English; and typical child language development. Then you learned about the departures from normal that our profession views as disorders (or conditions, or at least potential problems; see Module 12). Finally, you learned about applying that information in clinical assessment, treatment, or management. You were required to pass tests, and then you were allowed and required to demonstrate your knowledge in your clinical practicum assignments, and then you were required to pass a final, high-stakes licensing examination.

Why was your education organized that way?

The usual answers are that we cannot understand what is abnormal or atypical until we understand what is normal or typical, and that we cannot make appropriate decisions about management unless we understand the nature of the disorder.

But dig a little deeper underneath those answers.

Why do we say that students cannot understand atypical until they understand typical?

Why do we say that clinicians cannot understand treatment or management unless they understand the normal referent and the departures from normal that the client’s current abilities represent?

Notice, if we keep playing this game, that your explanations will probably devolve into restatements of the conclusion: “Students cannot understand what is atypical until they have learned what is typical because the typical serves as the base for learning about the atypical.”

These beliefs make sense to us, because we are fish in water.

But if can manage to get outside ourselves and think about our thinking, we realize that starting with normal is not strictly necessary in any objective sense; it is merely an underlying cultural assumption of our profession. It is part of the cultural belief system that we have inherited as members of our profession, and it directly reflects the interests of our original 25 professional ancestors. As Duchan and Hewitt (2023) recently catalogued in some detail, this tendency toward ableism (or perhaps “normalism,” an assumption of and preference for that which is perceived as “normal”) was clear in the earliest writings of the 25 founders of the 1925 association that became ASHA — and the same view has continued to shape our profession, not only as a belief but as the underlying structure of our entire educational system and our entire approach to what we describe as basic clinical practice.

This cultural centering of normalcy has also shaped how we describe our profession to ourselves and to other people, throughout our profession’s history. In 1952, for example, multiple representatives of our profession worked together to develop a description of speech-language pathology to be used by the organizers of the MidCentury White House Conference on Children and Youth (ASHA Committee, 1952). In the ASHA Committee’s report to the Conference, children with speech disorders were described as one of the country’s “largest groups of seriously handicapped youngsters,” “urgently” in “need” of help. Persons with disabilities who “can speak normally” or at least “nearly so” were described as “tremendously different, as a rule... from [those] whose speech is gravely impaired,” and “the degree to which the family life may be carried on, in a normal fashion” was described as depending “very heavily upon whether the speech function of the handicapped individual is intact.” Even “relatively minor speech and voice defects” were described as disqualifying children from potential careers “such as teaching, [that] requir[e] good speech.”

Do you hear the underlying assumptions that are made explicit by these words? “Handicapped,” “impaired,” “normal,” “intact”; one of the more striking features of the ASHA MidCentury Report, to my reading as we approach the middle of the 21st century, is how casually and confidently the committee used such terminology. They seem to have been either utterly unaware of, or utterly convinced of, their underlying assumption that people who spoke or communicated in ways other than the ways that they assumed to be “normal” were “handicapped,” unable to participate “normally” in family life or in their chosen vocations, interfering with their entire families’ “normal” lives, and “urgently” in “need” of therapy designed to return them to an “intact” state.

Other examples of more or less explicit ableism or normalism are also obvious in our profession’s clinically-oriented journal articles or textbooks from different eras, including well after the 1950s. Our literature includes a continued emphasis throughout the decades on seeking “normal” speech and resonance for children who were born with cleft lip or cleft palate (e.g., Blakely & Brockman, 1995). And it’s not just history; well into the 21st century, our publications and textbooks continue to emphasize how exactly to elicit “correct” production of phonemes; the “need” to “suppress” and “eliminate” the use of “deviant” phonological patterns; and recommendations for the use of interventions that not only teach conversational skills but actually provide word-for-word scripts and specific goals for how an “appropriate” conversation must be structured, for clients we have diagnosed with social (pragmatic) communication disorder (see ASHA, n.d. and current as of this writing, about social communication disorder).

Why?

Why have we assumed that some residual hypernasality is a problem that must be fixed, rather than assuming and accepting that people are born with a range of facial anatomies that can reasonably be expected to lead to a range of nasality?

Why would it even occur to us to literally script something as dynamic and unpredictable as a future conversation between two other human beings?

In these and many other examples, there is definitely some very clear evidence that our profession assumes that normal exists, that normal serves as a reasonable starting point, and that normal is preferred.

Has anyone ever questioned these assumptions? Yes, of course, and such questions also appear to be becoming more common in our professional culture, as you might have already been aware while reading this section.

As long ago as 1976, Clase drew on the constructs of stereotypes, social judgments, and continua that have shaped this website’s discussions as she asked “how different” speech must be to be considered “too different” and asked “To whom must it sound different?” (Clase, 1976, p. 51). She also questioned whether we “have the right” to make judgments about other people’s speech or to decide who needs treatment, given that such judgments can often be “subjective, arbitrary, and personal” (p. 51). She concluded by “questioning the ethics of... imposing our values on others and fostering a prescriptive position regarding acceptable speech behavior” (p. 55).

Later, similarly, in the first issue of the new American Journal of Speech-Language Pathology, Crais (1991) reviewed what had become by that time close to 10 years’ worth of work in the field of early intervention. Her article emphasized collaborating with parents and families, by which she meant supporting them as they seek to find the resources they want and develop the routines they find useful, given their reality as a starting point rather than given our values or our views about “normal” as a starting point. (We will discuss ethnographic interviewing, a specific clinical technique for helping ourselves understand clients and families in their own worlds, in Module 18.)

Most recently, as the constructs of ableism and neurodiversity have become common in society and in our profession (see Diedrich, 2023; Duffy, 1981), many other authors in ASHA’s journals and elsewhere have begun to argue explicitly in favor of rejecting the notion that any “normal” exists or can be preferred. They write about resisting ableism, accepting neurodiversity, and embracing our “ethical duty” as professionals to “acknowledge, respect, and value disability as a culture” and as an identity (Saia, 2023, p. 795; see also the collection of papers edited by DeThorne & Gerlach-Houck, 2023, among other examples).

The intersecting dimensions reflected here are complex, and we will return in the next module to thinking about the professional behaviors that might flow from our assumptions about “normalcy.” Before we get there, however, we need to address one more assumption that combines the constructs of professionals, clients, and normalcy with several other critical issues.

Your Turn

As you think about normal, typical, normalism, or ableism in our professional culture, does it matter if we are discussing congenital, developmental, progressive, or suddenly-acquired characteristics, abilities, or conditions? Why or why not?

You might be familiar with the abbreviations WNL and WFL (within normal limits and within functional limits, respectively). If your work setting uses these abbreviations, how are they interpreted and applied? Do they represent an ableist assumption that “normal” exists, or do they represent an anti-ableist understanding that functional is a range that can be achieved in many ways? (If your answer was “recognition that functional is a range,” is it really? Does the “functional range” still basically center a presumed “normal”?) Where do our different interpretations of the same words or the same abbreviations come from?

If you use the abbreviation WFL to describe any client’s abilities as functional for them, do you think of yourself as being actively anti-ableist when you do so? Why or why not?

Underlying Assumption Three: The Speech, Language, and Social Communication Patterns of White Monolingual Speakers of the Northern Dialects of American English Are Normal, Typical, More Important, Preferred, and/or At the Very Least Necessary in Some Contexts

Did that heading bother you?

It might have, and it should, in a lot of ways and for a lot of reasons.

And yet, have you ever heard the old aphorism that anyone with access to your checkbook or your calendar can figure out what you value? It’s an imperfect joke, of course, but it’s not entirely untrue; where we spend our money and how we spend our time reflects, on the whole, what we believe in. Archeologists, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and others use a similar method when they study the products of a culture. We can learn a lot about any group of people by observing the things they make and the records they leave behind.

Consider, for example, our professional journals. Do you happen to know what the very first article was, in the first issue of the first volume of our profession’s first journal?

The first article in Volume 1, Issue 1, of our new profession’s first journal, the Journal of Speech Disorders, was titled “Correcting the mechanism causing most foreign brogue” (Barker, 1936).

The first thing that our professional ancestors felt the need to publish, when our new profession started its own journal in 1936, was that the spoken English of people who had immigrated to the U.S. was “unsatisfactory” (Barker, 1936, p. 4).

Barker’s (1936) article provided extensive detail about coarticulation in English and about the transfer to later-learned languages of the phonological patterns, phonological constraints, and prosodic features of earlier-learned languages, all of which we might even today see as important information. He then conveyed his underlying assumptions very clearly, as he proceeded to explain how speech-language pathologists could and should use this information to help clients “overcome all trace of faulty accent” (Barker, 1936, p. 4). A year later, in a different article focused primarily on some details of French pronunciation and linguistic theory, Barker (1937) again referred to the need for “correction” of accents.

And it was not only the research journals; our profession’s textbooks also explicitly furthered the professional assumption that certain accents or dialects needed to be “corrected.” The first edition of Van Riper’s (1939) classic and still influential textbook, for example, ended with six treatment chapters, one each for language delay, articulation, voice, stuttering, cleft palate, and “bilingualism and foreign dialect.” The “bilingualism and foreign dialect” chapter explicitly used the word “error” to refer to the speech patterns and the word “treatment” to describe the necessary actions by the speech therapist.

This assumption that “foreign” speech could be considered a disorder, on an equivalent footing with language delay or cleft palate, marked our profession for decades. Wise (1946, p. 330) referred to “the defects that result from environmental background such as foreign language dialect,” and Konigsberg and Windecker (1955) began their tutorial about speech correction in high schools by listing five types of disorders typically seen in that setting: “articulatory faults...voice problems...disturbance in fluency...speech problems related to hearing loss, and...foreign accent” (p. 247). The second (1947) and third (1954) editions of Van Riper’s book retained the foreign dialect treatment chapter. As late as 1978, MacKay (1978) explained that teaching English to speakers of other languages is “remediation,” requiring the same pedagogical or clinical techniques that are required in treating disorders for monolingual English speakers.

We also need to be blunt and clear, as we were in addressing raciolinguistics in Section Two, that this emphasis on treating accents as disorders did not extend to all accents.

Did your phonetics or language development classes include the opportunity to complete narrow transcriptions of any version of Scottish English or British English? They are distinctly different from American English, including in several characteristics of vowel use, realizing the grapheme “th” as the phoneme /f/, and the use of the velar fricative /x/. The differences extend well beyond accent, also, into language forms that characterize dialects. Many individual semantic items differ, from lifts and lorries to chips and biscuits. British English uses several prepositions differently from the way American English uses them (including to live “in” a street and to do things “at” the weekend). Speakers of British English use present perfect verb constructions (“I’ve lost my wallet,” “She’s brought some pencils”) where an American English speaker would probably describe the simple past as correct or necessary, and speakers of British English frequently add what American English considers an unnecessary (or even incorrect) verb in such phrases as “I might do” (for the American “I might” – although some Southern dialects of American English use the related “I might could”).

But would a White, monolingual English-speaking child from London be judged in need of speech or language therapy in the U.S. on the basis of these patterns?

No.

And is the reason astoundingly obvious, as you think about which accents and dialects have been judged to be problematic by our profession and which have not? Remember, as we discussed in earlier modules, that the reasoning behind many judgments about accents and dialects often has much less to do with the phonology or the language forms and much more to do with the (incorrect, stereotyped, and discriminatory) assumptions and judgments that a listener has already made about the speaker’s identities or background.

You are correct, therefore, if you are aware that the “foreign” or language-history-based accents deemed to be problematic within our profession have often been those accents produced by people who, as we have addressed, had already been judged by our White, English-speaking professional ancestors to be not White, not speaking the “appropriate” dialects of English with an “appropriate” accent, or both.

The same can be said, of course, about the cultural dialects of American English.

As was also true for the normalism or ableism that has marked our professional culture, of course, we can also find examples of other views. Wing (1972), for example, presented a relatively early example of the kind of information that is now emphasized in our field: that some articulatory or phonological patterns in children learning English are predictable based on their first language (or multiple earlier languages) and are not markers of disorders at all, while other patterns cannot be explained by a child’s language history and are more likely to represent disorders. Gandour (1980), similarly, in a response to McKay’s (1978) paper, explained that language learning and language transfer are not disorders and do not need therapy, and that teaching English to speakers of other languages must be differentiated, professionally, from providing speech therapy or remediation. [The prevailing view of the time was then clarified, however, by ASHA’s Clinical Certification Board (1980): Clinical work designed to teach pronunciation to English language learners was to be viewed as treatment.]

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